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What Best Explains Successful Protest







It has been 15 years since the last wave of democratization. But as a
region, North Africa and the Middle East were noticeably devoid of pop-
ular democracy movements—until the early months of 2011. Democrati-
zation movements had existed long before technologies like mobile
phones and the Internet came to these countries. But with these tech-
nologies, people sharing an interest in democracy built extensive net-
works and activated collective action movements for political change.
What might have made regimes more susceptible than others to these
uprisings, and what might explain the relative successes of some move-
ments over others? What role does information technology have in the
modern recipe for democratization? Weighing multiple political, eco-
nomic, demographic, and cultural conditions, we find that information
infrastructure—especially mobile phone use—consistently appears as
one of the key ingredients in parsimonious models for the conjoined
combinations of causes behind regime fragility and social movement
success. To understand the successes and failures of contemporary polit-
ical protests, we must also assess how civil society leaders and authoritar-
ian security forces treat communication technologies as democratically
consequential.
Over the course of a year, popular movements for democracy cascaded across
the Middle East and North Africa. These were not Marxist or Islamist move-
ments, and while there was great diversity in the expectations for what democ-
racy could look like, there was a shared fatigue with authoritarian rule. In the
early days of protest in each country, the participants were unusual: they were
not the urban poor, unionized labor, existing opposition party members, radical
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Islamists, or minorities with grievances. They were middle-class, educated, and
underemployed, relatively leaderless, and technology-savvy youth. The gender
balance also surprised many observers. In what has come to be called the “Arab
Spring” by optimists, and the “Arab Revolts” by others, four dictators have been
successfully deposed, a dozen other regimes have made major political and eco-
nomic concessions, and political turmoil has devolved into civil war in several
others.
By 2012, Egypt and Tunisia had run elections and were drafting fresh constitu-
tions, and there were new Parliaments and Cabinets in Morocco and Jordan,
with significant commitments to extend franchise. Even in Constitutional Monar-
chies where ruling families remained in control, a greatly expanded welfare state
was the cost of the stability. Several countries are now governed by transitional
governments with imperfect constitutions and predatory militaries. It will be
years before we can judge the democratic practices of the new governments. But
even in countries where Islamism is on the rise, the most viable Islamist leaders
are competing in elections and advocating different brands of Islamic Constitu-
tionalism. And what is surprisingly important is the powerful role of digital
media in both socializing young people into the existing tropes of political domi-
nance or revolution and in allowing young people to create new rhetorical tools
—and often logistical tools—for challenging ideological control (Howard and
Hussain 2013; Singh 2013).
For many observers, digital media appeared to have an important role in the
ignition of social protest, the cascade of inspiring images and stories of success
across the countries of the region, and the peculiar organizational form that
Arab Spring uprisings had (Tufekci and Wilson 2012). For scholars of compara-
tive politics, the distribution of outcomes suggest a need to take information
technology seriously as a potentially causal factor: the two Arab Spring countries
in which dictators were deposed relatively quickly, Tunisia and Egypt, had the
most tech-savvy civil society and large Internet-using populations in the region;
the two Arab spring countries in which dictators were deposed only after months
of protracted civil war, Libya and Yemen, had no such character. What more can
we say about the necessary or sufficient ingredients of successful cases where pro-
test cascades resulted in relatively peaceful transitions away from decades of
authoritarian rule? In contrast, which factors consistently predict failures, vio-
lence, or entrenchment of authoritarianism?
We build on a six-stage framework for political change observed during the
early aftermath of the Arab Spring to understand the contextual variables that
were in play before the Arab Spring (Howard and Hussain 2011). The most suc-
cessful cases of sustained and peaceful protest, with deposed despots, were Tuni-
sia and Egypt. Both cases exemplified a pattern that can be seen, with different
degrees of strength, across the region: a preparation phase, involving activists’ use
of digital media across time to build solidarity networks and identification of col-
lective identities and goals; an ignition phase, involving symbolically powerful
moments which ruling elites and regimes intentionally or lazily ignored, but
which galvanized the public; a protest phase, where, by employing offline net-
works and digital technologies, small groups strategically organized on large
numbers; an international buy-in phase, where digital media networks extended
the range of local coverage to international broadcast networks; a climax phase,
where the regime maneuvered strategically or carelessly to appease public dis-
content through welfare packages or harsh repressive actions; and finally, a fol-
low-on information warfare phase, where various actors, state-based and from
international civic advocacy networks, compete to shape the future of civil society
and information infrastructure that made it possible.
But this narrative of “digitally enabled” political change, though generalizable to
many Arab Spring cases, does not account for some important technology-related
Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard 49
factors that were in play as well. Moreover, it is tempting to follow this chronology
of phases and begin anticipating what is next to come. It is important to recognize
that successful uses of digital media across many cases of the Arab world are poten-
tially counterbalanced by important instances where digital media, even when
available, may not have been very useful. As we will demonstrate, digital media and
information and communication technologies (ICTs) can also empower
authoritarian security forces in improving their management and coercion capabil-
ities. For example, the United Arab Emirates boasts some of the highest levels of
connectivity and e-government development in the Arab world, but this country
experienced hardly any successful offline mobilization. Some regimes, including
Saudi Arabia, were very masterful in designing information censorship and man-
agement protocols nearing the sophistication of China and Iran. It is wrong-
headed to construct a technologically deterministic theory of contemporary
democratization, but it is good social science to critically assess the role of tools
that have enabled both social movement leaders and empowered recalcitrant
dictators.
Communication Technologies and Political Change
There have been few global studies of the contribution of different kinds of
information technology toward democratization movements. In one of the larg-
est of public opinion analyses, Nesbit et al. find that the Internet drives demo-
cratic expectations, especially in countries that already have a few democratic
habits (Nisbet, Stoycheff, and Pearce 2012). Ever since the Zapatista rebels used
the World Wide Web to promote their struggle for indigenous land rights in
1994, international analysts have been engaged in explaining the uses of digital
technology by grassroots activists and social movements and determining the
technologies’ effects on political outcomes (Meikle 2002; Russell 2001, 2005). In
years since, many have contributed valuable insights into this phenomenon in
specific geographic and temporal contexts, sometimes focused on moments of
heightened contention, such as national elections or social justice campaigns
(Margolis, Resnick, and Tu 1997; Pedersen and Saglie 2005; Howard 2010; Sre-
berny and Khiabany 2010; Earl and Kimport 2011). Others have taken a the-
matic approach, viewing a specific phenomenon, such as digital
authoritarianism, across a group of representative countries (Kalathil and Boas
2003). These scholars have drawn on qualitative and quantitative data and have
written from a variety of subject perspectives, including sociology, communica-
tions, political science, computer science, and area studies. Yet all have been lim-
ited to a specific country or region and have a fairly limited time horizon.
Studies suggest that along with wealth, telecommunications and information
policy can contribute to democratization (Norris 2001; Milner 2006; Howard and
Mazaheri 2009). Many have hypothesized that increased Internet usage supports
the growth of democratic institutions (Hogan 1999; Abbott 2001; George 2006).
Yet both democracies and dictatorships have fast-growing numbers of Internet
users, Internet hosts, mobile phones, and personal computers. Authoritarian
regimes may develop their digital communication infrastructure specifically to
extend state power (Kalathil and Boas 2003). There is significant research on
the censorship strategies of the most authoritarian of Islamic states, but also evi-
dence that a significant amount of digital content is beyond the reach of state
censors (Diebert 2008). In democracies, there is some evidence that effective
state services online breeds trust and confidence among citizens in their govern-
ment (Hasan 2003; Welch, Hinnant, and Moon 2005; Tolbert and Mossberger
2006). As the experience of Iran in 2009 suggests, it may be the social media
that is more immune to censorship than other salvages of civil society in
repressive regimes.
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Indeed, there are lessons about civic action from Iran that may well be consis-
tent with the Arab Spring and the global #Occupy movements: digital technolo-
gies provide the entry points for young activists to explore democratic
alternatives, an action landscape such as cyberspace that allows for political dis-
course and even direct interventions with state policy, and coordinating mecha-
nisms that support synchronized social movements through marches, protests,
and other forms of collective action (Kirsh 2001; Warschauer, El Said, and Zohry
2002; Abdulla 2005, 2007; Shapiro 2009). Perhaps the clearest signs that digital
media has changed the dynamics of political communication come from the
awkward ways authoritarian regimes have responded to its own tech-savvy acti-
vists. In pre-revolutionary Egypt, when Muhammad Khaled Said posted an online
video incriminating the police in a drug deal, he was beaten to death outside of
his Internet cafe, an event that precipitated a Facebook group that was critical in
mobilizing elites during the revolution (York 2011).
While “terror on the Internet” and transnational Islamist identity has been well
explored in the security studies literature, relatively little research has been done
on the specific mechanisms of technology use and its repurposing by civil society
actors. Understanding such mechanisms would help us answer broader questions
about the nature of contemporary regime change, online participation, and the
security implications of information policy (Bunt 2000, 2003, 2009; Weimann
2006). Some area studies and Islamist scholars have studied information technol-
ogy diffusion and political practices in particular countries or investigated the
impact of Al Jazeera on news cycles and sourcing (Rugh 2004; Alavi 2005;
George 2006; Wheeler 2006). Information technologies are also the infrastruc-
ture for anti-democratic movements and the site of what some have called “cy-
berconflict” (Karatzogianni 2006). However, rigorous social science can build
more transportable theories about the role of social computing during political
crisis, and the role of social computing in civic life in the Muslim world. Cyber-
war and cyber terror are not the only form of social computing in the service of
political discourse (Stohl and Stohl 2007).
In the analytical discourse so far, there are two ways of describing the causes
and consequences of the Arab Spring. The first analytical frame is to identify the
things that make a country susceptible to protests or fragile enough for a popu-
lar uprising to ignite in the streets. The second is to identify the things that
might explain a successful uprising. It would be wrong-headed to debate how
many bloggers it takes to make a democracy. Rather than looking for simple or
singular causal explanations for what made a country susceptible to popular
uprisings or what allowed a popular uprising to achieve its goals, we should
expect that there would be complex causal patterns or even several causal reci-
pes that would provide analytical purchase over several sets of cases. Moreover,
knowing what we know about social movements and regime change, it makes
most sense to look for “conjoined causal conditions,” the set of multiple indica-
tors that together provide a fulfilling narrative for understanding political out-
comes. An examination of the political impacts of digital technologies should
not assume positive or negative effects. In fact, it should investigate the condi-
tions and factors that most consistently explain democratic change or persistent
authoritarianism. There is a rich body of growing literature on these issues—we
seek to extend the tradition by comparatively examining this latest cascade of
political change.
The Comparative Method and Fuzzy Logic
Comparative international researchers must deal with complex relationships
between macrostructures, political cultures, and social transformations (Elkins
1979). There are two popular approaches by which this is often done, and these
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methodological preferences are often grounded in distinct epistemologies. The
debates between the two are best manifested in the quantitative versus qualitative
debate (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 or Ragin 2008, respectively, for both
perspectives). In contrast, the Boolean algebra and set theory–based fuzzy set
approach offer important advantages by combining the strengths of qualitative
case knowledge but extending the range of explanation beyond one or two cases
(Ragin 1987).
This uniquely comparative method combines some of the affordances of vari-
able-oriented quantitative approaches with the strengths of case-oriented qualita-
tive knowledge (Mahoney 2010). When applied to the Arab Spring, there have
been a significant number of single-country case studies in which information
technologies have been part of the contemporary narrative of both democratic
entrenchment and persistent authoritarianism. The comparative perspective
taken in our investigation will not be limited to the standard cases, or even to sit-
uations that stand out as incidents of technology-driven, enhanced, or enabled
regime change. Instead, our comparative perspective embraces cases in which
information technologies had little to no role in democratic promotion, as well
as situations in which information technologies were carefully used by authoritar-
ian elites to become better bullies, and situations in which information technolo-
gies played a critical role in sudden democratic transitions. Methodologically,
this approach is powerful and productive in that it confronts theory with data.
The set of cases at hand is the population of Arab countries with large Muslim
communities, and there are 20 of these.
The argument of this investigation is that in recent years, information technol-
ogies have opened up new paths to democratization and the entrenchment of
civil society in many Arab countries. Large-N quantitative researchers often turn
“democratization” into an indicator for which the Western democracies are the
standard. In our set-theoretic approach, we assume that democratization among
these 20 countries is best calibrated according to a more regionally relevant stan-
dard, set at the high end by countries such as Lebanon and at the low end by
countries such as Saudi Arabia. This calibration does not preclude the theoreti-
cal possibility of an Islamic democratic ideal type. But a grounded approach
does assume that healthy, functional Muslim democracies may not look like Wes-
tern democracies. Set-theoretic reasoning allows for fine gradations in the
degree of membership in the set of successful democratic outcomes, and it
requires evidence about each country’s degree of membership in the set of
countries that have experienced democratic transition or entrenchment during
or since the Arab Spring.
Moreover, a set-theoretic explanation of the role of information technology in
contemporary democratization requires that we identify a consistent set of causal
relations between technology diffusion and democratic outcomes. To construct
this explanation requires fuzzy set logic, which does not explain variation in a
sample through reductive correlational statistics. The qualitative, empirical evi-
dence reviewed lends itself to a set-theoretic argument, because the evidence
revealed that many of the countries experiencing protests have high levels of
technology diffusion and almost all experienced significant changes in their
political systems. Identifying the causal conditions shared by cases that have fur-
ther democratized is appropriate for identifying the necessary conditions of
democratization.
It is possible that there are several recipes for contemporary democratization,
and many possible ingredients and combinations of ingredients. One way to
assemble the accumulated country experience is by comparing the recent
histories of countries that share the common outcome of a significant period of
democratic transition or entrenchment, such as in the Arab Spring. Analyzing
the relationships in this set-theoretic manner exposes the key ingredients for
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democratization in a time-bound and qualitatively rich context. Moreover, treat-
ing the institutional outcomes as fuzzy sets avoids selecting cases on the outcome
because countries will actually vary in their degree of membership in the set dis-
playing democratic transition or entrenchment. Set theory allows us to examine
cases with the same causal conditions to see whether they also share the same
outcome. More important, if we assume that there is not just one recipe for con-
temporary democratization, but several, we can use fuzzy set analysis to identify
combinations of causal conditions that share the same outcome.
Causal Variables
Several contextual factors might exacerbate or mitigate the causal role of partic-
ular aspects of technology diffusion, and reducing the set of causal attributes to
a few important ones must also respect the significant diversity among these
countries. The cases involved in the Arab Spring differ in important ways, yet
there may still be causal patterns and shared attributes that explain membership
in the set of countries that have democratized or not. Along with the impact of
technology diffusion on the system of political communication involving states,
journalists, political parties, civil society groups, and cultural elites, additional
contextual conditions should also be evaluated on a case-by-case basis:
Average Incomes Within Country
Measured as GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity), this factor
accounts for the large diversity in economic productivity across the region. The
high end of this scale includes rich countries like Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and
Bahrain (average range of $7,000–20,000); the low end includes countries like
Mauritania, Iraq, Comoros, and Somalia (average range of $200–800).
Wealth Distribution
Measured as Gini coefficients for income distribution, this indicator reveals the
relative deprivation of the poor in society. It captures the distinctions between
countries like Lebanon and Qatar, where wealth is comparatively well distrib-
uted, and Egypt and the UAE, where wealth is highly concentrated.
Levels of Unemployment
Access to jobs may have been a primary source of discontent in Arab Spring
countries, particularly in countries like Tunisia and Yemen where the formal
unemployment rates topped 15 percent. Employment may also be a compara-
tively important variable because some of the countries with weak protest turn-
out had low unemployment rates. In Saudi Arabia, formal employment was
hovering around 5 percent, and it was even lower in Kuwait. Youth unemploy-
ment is also a useful variable to include because of anecdotal evidence that the
political uprisings were led by disaffected youth.
Demographic Variables
The causes of political unrest during the Arab Spring could be plausibly related
to having large groups of disaffected citizens in densely packed urban settle-
ments, so it is important to include measures of the size of the country in terms
of population, the degree of urbanization, and youth bulge. Almost the entire
population of Qatar and Kuwait lives in urban centers, while less than 40 percent
of Yemen and Somalia’s population does so. Yemen and Somalia also have the
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largest proportion of population under 25 years old—some 45 percent of the
total population—while less than 25 percent of the population of Qatar and
Kuwait is under 25 years old. Overall, the Arab Spring countries include both
small island states with a few million inhabitants and countries like Egypt, with
large populations.
Digital Connectivity
We measure digital connectivity in the diffusion of mobile telephone and Inter-
net use. Interestingly, more than half of Arab countries have mobile penetration
well over 100 percent, including several of the countries where Arab Spring pro-
tests were most successful. Internet penetration rates do not always mirror
mobile phone penetration rates, however. While 54 percent of the population of
Bahrain has Internet access, it is a country where the popular uprising was
quickly crushed. Only 15 percent of Egyptians have access to the Internet, but in
that country the dictator was successfully removed.
Censorship Sophistication
To counterbalance digital access and shared connectivity, many regimes in the
Arab world have instituted censorship mechanisms that range widely in levels of
sophistication. A few countries have very sophisticated monitoring and manage-
ment systems, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. Others did not
have the ability or failed to do so, including Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. To exam-
ine these cases comparatively, we created an index combining the OpenNet
Initiative’s monitoring of countries that had instituted no filtering, or a range of
selective, substantial, and pervasive filtering on content for political, social,
security reasons or used automated tools to do so. Our index combines these
multiple dimensions of censorship and sophistication in filtering to assess the
overall censorship regime’s capacity for managing new information infrastructure.
Fuel-dependent Economy
Having access to the wealth generated by a fuel-dependent economy can allow
ruling elites to maintain social control. Not having this wealth means authoritar-
ian rules may not have the resources to maintain internal security services and
co-opt political opponents. To account for this significant variable, we included
countries’ level of oil production and its share in the global oil resources avail-
able. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait ranked most highly.
Outcome Variables
Because our key research questions deal with the contextual factors and variables
at play during the Arab Spring, many of our predictive variables listed above
come from the latest data points available at or just before the protest periods.
However, our overall objective is to find a parsimonious set of causes or con-
joined causes that explain what made some Arab Spring regimes resistant to
popular uprisings and then what made some popular uprisings successful.
Regime Fragility
This was evaluated by the relative numbers and impact of protest mobilizations
in each of the countries of the Arab Spring. Full membership in the set of
fragile Arab Spring countries was given to the countries where street turnout was
surprisingly large, attendance was consistently high over several days, domestic
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media attention unusually interested, and protests took place in an unexpected
number of diverse locations. Lower scores went to cases where protest turnout
was small, concentrated in only a few locations, or protesters themselves were
quickly dissuaded.
Social Movement Success
Outcomes were graded on a straightforward, comparative Guttman score for
how successful protest organizers were at achieving the immediate goals of
regime change. The highest scores went to cases that are fully in the set of coun-
tries where the titular head of government was deposed with minimal violence—
these were the ideal cases of peaceful democratic regime change (Egypt and
Tunisia). Below this are the countries where major political and economic con-
cessions were made (Oman and Saudi Arabia), followed by major political con-
cessions only (Kuwait and Jordan), followed by economic concessions only
(Lebanon and Bahrain), and lastly countries that reached bloody civil wars and/
or violent stalemates with ruling elites (Libya and Syria). Long-term success in
achieving economic, employment, or constitution writing goals was not evalu-
ated. The fuzzy ranks for this variable took into account the detailed qualitative
information for each case, including the longevity of protest, numbers of killed
and injured citizens, types of meaningful political concessions, and levels of eco-
nomic redistributions of wealth.
Data Calibration
We used data from 2011 or the best available year.2 Demographic and economic
data came from sources like the United Nations Data Program, technology data
came from the International Telecommunications Union, and political
data came from primary data collected and synthesized by the authors. When
the data taken from large data sets were incomplete, we supplemented data from
secondary sources. Patching these gaps by hand significantly reduced the
number of missing cases and provided for a more robust and meaningful rank-
ing system. Preparing data for treatment as a fuzzy set required several steps.
First, we computed indices for the plausible causal factors—which means
converting the data into a number between 0 and 1. Then, we calibrated the
indices, a process that evens out the distribution of cases between the thresholds
for full inclusion in each set, full exclusion from the set, and the crossover point
at which cases go from being partially in the set to being partially out of the set.
The variable of population size provides a useful example of how this process
works. Among the 20 countries, there are a few very populated countries and
many countries with a small population. Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are at the
top of this set and help define the category of “populated Arab Spring country.”
Fuzzy calibrations also allow comparativists to complete incomplete data sets.
In this study, there were four hand calibrations. There were no censorship scores
for Djibouti, Mauritania, and Somalia, but secondary sources suggest that the
level of censorship in Djibouti was much like that of Kuwait, that the level of
censorship in Mauritania was higher than Lebanon’s but not as a high as Jor-
dan’s, and that the level of censorship in Somalia was almost as high as that in
Saudi Arabia. As another example, the final hand calibration involved designat-
ing a democracy-level score for Somalia. Polity IV data identifies Somalia as a
2The full data set of all variables in the causal recipes described in this investigation is available at www.pITPI.
org, as are the technical scripts for secondary solution sets not described here and the calibration points for specific
membership sets. For more on fuzzy set calibrations, see the codebook for the fs/QCA 2.0 software and Ragin
(2000).
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failed state in 2010. This case is not likely to teach us much about a theoretical
relationship between political institutions, technology diffusion, and popular
movements for democracy, so it was given a fuzzy score of 0.50. This is a special
score designating a case that is neither in nor out of the theoretical set of
democracies. A score of 0.51 would mean that a country is very slightly in the
theoretical set of democracies, and a score of 0.49 would mean that a country is
just out of such a set. But the transition score signals that if regime type is
important, Somalia is not a good instance of either a democracy or an autocracy.
The fuzzy scores used in this analysis appear in Table 1.
Recipes for Transition Failures and Successes
Movement success is a qualitatively difficult judgment to make, but comparative
analysis makes such judgments both possible and plausible. Many of the leaders
and participants of the Arab Spring movements sought the removal of a long-
standing dictator or a change in executive authority. Others primarily sought
economic or political concessions, and most movements sought to achieve these
things without state reprisals. Thus, the judgment of success should not only be
about the degree to which a movement achieved their public policy goals, but
whether they did so without arrests, torture, loss of life, or property damage, and
did so in a relatively short period of time. Tunisia and Egypt probably define the
theoretical set of “successful” Arab Spring movements, because it is in these
countries where leaders were deposed relatively quickly and relatively peacefully.
Libya’s leader was deposed too, but with much more sacrifice and as of writing,
Syria’s position is precarious but has had a year of violence and civil war. In Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, there were lesser suc-
cesses and successes in different ways. In Algeria and Sudan, the Arab Spring
movements were small and relatively humble. Comparatively speaking, the social
movement mobilization was not only unsuccessful, the state reprisals were severe
enough that the social movement collapsed under repression. Bahrain probably
defines full non-membership in the theoretical set, because it is here that the
TABLE 1. Comparative Statistical Scores for Set Membership
Country Gdppc Gini Unemp Urban Youth Mobile Internet Fuel Pol Success
Algeria 0.58 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.32 1 0.83 0.55
Bahrain 0.84 0.42 0.58 0.89 0.26 0.68 0.89 0.58 0.11 0.2
Djibouti 0.16 0.74 1 0.63 0.74 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.83 0.3
Egypt 0.32 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.58 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.56 0.95
Iraq 0.05 0.11 0.74 0.42 0.89 0.42 0.79 0.37 0.94 0.3
Jordan 0.53 0.58 0.47 0.01 0.63 0.63 0.47 0.05 0.56 0.6
Kuwait 0.89 0.01 0.05 1 0.16 0.84 0.74 0.89 0.28 0.6
Lebanon 0.63 0.95 0.32 0.84 0.21 0.26 0.58 0.11 1 0.6
Libya 0.68 0.42 0.84 0.68 0.42 0.95 0.11 0.95 0.28 0.8
Mauritania 0.11 0.68 0.84 0.21 0.84 0.32 0.05 0.26 0.67 0.4
Morocco 0.42 0.79 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.53 0.68 0.21 0.44 0.6
Oman 0.79 0.21 0.58 0.58 0.47 0.89 0.84 0.68 0.11 0.6
Qatar 1 0.79 0.01 0.95 0.01 0.74 0.95 0.63 0.01 0.5
Saudi 0.74 0.21 0.16 0.74 0.53 1 0.47 0.79 0.01 0.6
Somalia 0.01 0.01 0.95 0.11 1 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.5 0.5
Sudan 0.26 1 0.79 0.16 0.79 0.11 0.21 0.74 0.67 0.55
Syria 0.37 0.42 0.21 0.32 0.68 0.21 0.42 0.47 0.28 0.7
Tunisia 0.47 0.79 0.53 0.53 0.11 0.58 0.63 0.32 0.5 0.95
UAE 0.95 0.11 0.11 0.79 0.05 0.79 1 0.53 0.11 0.4
Yemen 0.21 0.58 0.58 0.05 0.95 0.16 0.26 0.84 0.67 0.95
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state crackdown has been the toughest. By gradation, the relative failure of Arab
Spring movements also means low scores for Djibouti, Iraq, Mauritania, and the
UAE. Qatar and Somalia are transition cases—neither in nor out—because they
had no significant popular uprising. Table 2 offers more of the details about
each of the movement outcomes as of the publication of this article.
Each single Arab Spring country could be described with its unique combina-
tion of causal factors. Certainly, there are more complex formulations of condi-
tions that would also explain the susceptibility of a regime to a popular uprising,
or the chances such an uprising would be successful. The combinations reported
here are not the only plausible ones, but the limited combinations that plausibly
explain multiple cases with good coverage and consistency. Coverage refers to the
percentage of cases explained by that recipe. Consistency refers to the degree to
which cases adhere to a particular causal recipe. Since the goal of comparative
work is sensible, parsimonious explanations, Table 3 presents four of the parsi-
monious models with the best balance of case coverage and solution consistency
addressing the causal recipes of successes or failures of the Arab Spring move-
ments. These recipes had the largest raw coverage of cases with good consis-
tency. As a set, they explain half the cases with excellent consistency. Notably,
several countries can be explained by several plausible causal recipes, and these
recipes do not cover any unique cases on their own. The first causal combination
includes being relatively authoritarian, not having a relatively fuel-dependent
economy, many mobile phone users, or particularly high rates of unemployment.
The second combination—with the highest raw coverage score—simply involves
being an Arab Spring social movement in a country with no fuel-dependent
economy or a youth bulge.
The third and fourth causal combinations introduce the Internet-use variable,
on both occasions with a positive valence. Internet use contributes to movement
success in countries where the unemployment rate is not particularly high or in
countries where the level of wealth distribution is particularly unequal. This set
of explanations is particularly powerful for explaining what happened in Egypt,
Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Relative to the other countries involved in the
Arab Spring, these are the best instances of these conjoined causal combina-
tions. There are several interesting implications of these recipes. First, not being
a country where the national economy is dependent on fuel exports is a consis-
tent ingredient in all the recipes of social movement success. Second, widespread
use of mobile phone technologies was less important for the success of social
movements than Internet use. However, the latter does appear as a key ingredi-
ent in two causal recipes. Therefore, having a mobile-enabled population is use-
ful, particularly when protests have been ignited. But more than access to
mobile technologies, having a long-term Internet-enabled civil society appears in
all recipes.
Discussion
Digital media were critical during the short-term cascade of street protests of the
Arab Spring. We know that online conversations spiked before major events on
the ground, as well as across the region (Howard et al. 2011). This was possible
because social media helped democratic ideas spread across borders, through
informal networks of families, friends, and interested onlookers. The intensity of
political conversations that took place preceding major street protests supports
the idea that virtual networks materialized before street protest networks. For
example, detailed maps and guides were widely available before protests began,
and provided would-be participants with strategies and nonviolence goals to sus-
tain periods of dissent. Facebook pages and Twitter conversations were essential
for designing and trying out new strategies as events took place on the ground.
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Political blogospheres, many based nationally, but others also based more
regionally, connected with political diaspora communities from France, the UK,
and other Western democratic countries (Etling et al. 2010). The ability to pro-
duce and consume political content was important because it created a sense of
shared grievances, and strong political efficacy that had not led to such sizable,
diverse, and quick mobilization before the Arab Spring.
However, it would be a mistake to suggest the democratic potential of informa-
tion technologies without considering its full range of roles, especially regimes’
management and manipulations of these tools. There are several regimes that
have very sophisticated strategies to effectively co-opt or coerce technology pro-
viders. One of the key threats to authoritarian regimes is elite defection. There-
fore, some regimes, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, follow a closely guarded,
systematic, and well-financed strategy to monitor and punish online acts of politi-
cal engagement. Others, like Egypt and Jordan, tolerated such incidents by
assuming that some venting of political dissatisfaction could be ventilated online
and therefore not materialize substantively offline. When dissatisfaction did even-
tually spill over, security forces took a range of measures to suppress the political
application of digital media. During extreme circumstances, entire global infor-
mation networks were taken offline. This strategy backfired, causing street pro-
tests to increase in numbers, especially in Egypt, where individuals turned to
traditional institutions to find each other, such as after Friday prayer services in
Cairo. Disconnecting large information networks also cost Egypt $18 million
USD per day by blocking global financial transactions. Digital media, in their
presence and absence, are politically consequential—but are they simply a new
“tool” for social protest? Or is there more that needs to be said about the mod-
ern character of political protests?
For scholars of social movements and collective action, there are several
interesting aspects of the Arab Spring: the distributed leadership of protest
organizers, the core groups of elite publics (literate, middle class, youth, women,
and technocrats) that were relatively quick in joining them, and the important
role that international news organizations played in giving them the global expo-
sure to help stave off overtly violent reactions from security forces. We can say
more than that the Internet changed the way political actors communicated—
social movement leaders and collective action networks shared strategies for
direct political action, created regional and international news events that
drew attention and sympathy from neighboring countries, and inspired others to
join and celebrate their causes. Counterfactual scenarios are important, but the
overwhelming evidence of what did happen concretely illustrates that the












pol*~fuel*~mobile*~unemp 0.34 0.02 0.95 Lebanon (0.68,0.6),
Egypt (0.56,1)
~fuel*~youth 0.45 0.00 0.87 Lebanon (0.79,0.6),
Tunisia (0.68,1),
Morocco (0.63,0.7)
~fuel*internet*~unemp 0.44 0.00 0.91 Morocco (0.63,0.7),
Lebanon (0.58,0.6)
~fuel*internet*gini 0.40 0.00 0.91 Morocco (0.68,0.7),
Tunisia (0.63,1),
Lebanon (0.58,0.6)
Notes. These causal recipes are the parsimonious solution set with a cutoff point set at 0.954. Altogether, the solu-
tion coverage is 0.51 and solution consistency is 0.89.
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patterns of political change in these protests were digitally enabled. One of the
key reasons why we must now turn our attention to the role of information tech-
nology is that citizens themselves have expressed its role, and remaining
authoritarian regimes are treating it as a critical threat to their power and stability.
We must also consider the years leading up to the Arab Spring, and the diffu-
sion of digital media, in the form of mobile phones, personal computers, and
software applications over time. These technologies and their applications have
significantly impacted the political communication systems and their relation-
ships to civil society organizations. First, mobile telephony, in the form of small
consumer-based communication devices, has allowed regular citizens to bear wit-
ness, record, and disseminate acts of injustice and repression by their ruling
elites and security forces. In important ways, authoritarian regimes to hold
phony elections also gained widespread infamy, particularly in the Egyptian elec-
tions of 2005, where Mubarak’s party won 89 percent of the vote. Mobile videos
uploaded to YouTube and other video-sharing sites disseminated actual footage
of vote counting and rigging. Second, over the last five years, Al Jazeera became
a functionally independent regional news organization, and with the addition of
the English-language network in 2006, an international powerhouse that illumi-
nated the accusations, criticisms, and failures of autocrats. Third, widespread In-
ternet access, though limited to middle-class urban-dwellers, offered everyday
citizens to synthesize social networks with broadcast networks to communicate
and engage with political issues. Together, these long-term trends mean that
information infrastructure helped decentralize state power, especially regimes
that were not quick enough to adapt their management strategies to regulate
these new political information spaces.
Digital media had a causal role in the Arab Spring in that they provided the
fundamental infrastructure of a social movement unlike the others that have
emerged in recent years in these countries. In the first few weeks of protest in
each country, the generation of people in the streets—and its leadership—was
clearly not interested in the three major models of political Islam. These social
movements were not seeking to replace secular dictatorships with Al Qaeda’s Sal-
afi Jihadism, Iran’s Shiite theocracy, or Saudi’s rigid Wahhabism (Wright 2011).
Instead, these mostly cosmopolitan and younger generations of mobilizers felt
disenfranchised by their political systems, saw vast losses in the poor manage-
ment of national economies and development (Ramadan 2012), and most
importantly, a consistent and widely shared narrative of common grievances—a
narrative which they learned about from each other and co-wrote on the digital
spaces of political writing and venting on blogs, videos shared on Facebook and
Twitter, and comment board discussions on international news sites like Al Jaze-
era and the BBC.
The causes of revolution are always complex, and the conditions under which
revolts succeed are rare. For a revolution to succeed, the government must seem
so unjust and inept that it is viewed as a threat to the country’s future. A coun-
try’s social, economic, and military elites must be alienated from the state and
no longer willing to defend it, which was true with Egypt and Tunisia in the
deposition of their dictators, but less so with Libya and Syria, and not so with
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The regime’s opponents must also build consensus
across a broad swath of the population, crossing ethnic, religious, and class
groups, which has been varied across the Arab Spring cases, but certainly bol-
stered with the diffusion of mobile and digital media networks (Goldstone
2011). Finally, international powers must either refuse to step in and defend the
government, or must constrain the government from defending itself too ruth-
lessly. The Arab Spring, then, is historically unique because it is the first set of
political upheavals in which most of these things were digitally mediated.
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Many of the dictators who have held on to power in the Middle East and
North Africa have done so by telling their population, their neighbors, and the
international community that they were the guardians against Islamist revolution.
Some Islamist parties may have benefitted from the Arab Spring, like in the
recent elections of Tunisia and Egypt, but these leaders did not lead the upris-
ings. In fact, they have categorically hesitated to join them until victory and polit-
ical change was close to a real possibility. Among the countries in the region,
those with high rates of technology diffusion and a significant, tech-savvy, and
young civil society were the ones where the Arab Spring was most successful,
along with regimes that had not mastered the art of managing information infra-
structure. The countries with the lowest rates of technology diffusion, or a frag-
mented civil society with few technology resources, had less successful uprisings.
Some of these later countries, including Libya, Syria, and Yemen, did experience
extended civil war, but the inciting incidents of political strife, again, were digi-
tally mediated. But on the whole, the role of digital media in the political unrest
of these countries was not as pronounced as it was in Tunisia, Egypt, and Mor-
occo, all of which experienced major political concessions ranging from demo-
cratic regime change or the uplifting of political sanctions and replacement of
ruling elites.
The argument devaluing the complex causal role of digital media in the Arab
Spring is often made through the simple claim that it is people, and their griev-
ances, that constitute political revolution. Pundits have made this claim in differ-
ent ways, but it is not helpful in improving our understanding of why
contemporary protest cascades are faster, and sometimes more successful, than
before. It is true that Facebook and Twitter did not cause revolutions, but it is
bad analysis to ignore the strategic and intentional uses of digital media in politi-
cal ways. Digitally networked activists have initiated some of the largest protests
this decade in Iran, the temporary lifting of the Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and
the global Occupy Wall Street movement. Digital media had a causal role in the
Arab Spring by providing the very infrastructure that created deep communica-
tion ties and organizational capacity in groups of activists before the major pro-
tests took place. Digital media are what regimes in turn have invested millions in
learning to censor and manage more effectively, with lessons drawn directly from
the Arab Spring.
Social media is also the reason we have such good documentation of events. It
is the reason that Egyptians had such live coverage of what was going on in Tuni-
sia, and also the reason that Moroccans, Jordanians, and Yemenis had coverage
of what was going on in Egypt, just as Libyans and Syrians had coverage of what
was going on in those countries, and so on. In other words, it was social media
that brought the narrative of successful social protest across multiple, previously
closed, authoritarian media systems. When things did not go well, as in the case
of Bahrain and Libya, activists in the continuing cascade took note and applied
these lessons—just as authoritarian regimes, like Syria and Bahrain, have made
interesting moves in opening up previously embargoed digital networks to better
monitor the strategies and activities of protestors. For the most part, it was physi-
cal intimidation that discouraged activists from communicating about their polit-
ical activity on Facebook. But these regimes also invested in their social media
strategy, actively employed people to create pro-government content to distribute
over social media networks, and attacked social movement leaders after identify-
ing them in activists’ online photographs.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for not dismissing the important causal
role of digital media in the Arab Spring is that the traditional analysis, privileg-
ing other factors, yields uncompelling explanations (Gause 2011). For example,
The Economist magazine built an index of how press freedom, corruption, demo-
cratic institutions, income, the youth bulge, and years of authoritarian rule
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might predict the vulnerabilities of particular regimes. But indexes like these
suggested that Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq were the most vulnerable. Yet they
are neither the inciting nor defining cases of the Arab Spring. Yemen, Libya,
and Syria had a small elite of technology activists who helped spread the word of
successful rebellion in other countries, but the tough authoritarian regimes
responded quickly and forcefully and with their own digital media strategy.
These countries descended into months of civil strife, and did not see a rapid or
peaceful regime transition. The countries that experienced rapid and relatively
peaceful regime collapse, or where regimes made major concessions, did not
appear particularly vulnerable—for example Egypt and Tunisia, or Saudi Arabia
and Morocco, respectively.
Social media and information infrastructure make useful contributions toward
social movement organizing and the mobilization of popular protest. A periph-
eral counting of media use and digital diffusion levels reveals that the countries
experiencing the most dramatic changes had low overall percentages of social
media use (Mourtada and Salem 2011). But limiting the analysis to aggregate
indicators precludes the possibility of telling a more complex, causal story. More-
over, if there is anything to the analytical frame of networks, the use of impor-
tant media by a few important nodes of users could be exceptionally
consequential. This is why, to unpack the complexities of the Arab Spring, we
must employ analytic approaches that make possible the examination of com-
plex social systems that constitute the overall aggregate of state-based cases.
Street protests were the most challenging manifestations of political opposition
for each regime’s security forces, and they were certainly bolstered by decades-
long economic and political disenfranchisement of their citizens. Yet the mil-
lions of individuals on the streets of capital cities around the region were not
disconnected individuals, and they also shared some generalizable similarities
like large young populations that were open to broader engagement tactics than
possible with the more traditional Islamist frameworks of previous generations.
In fact the opposite is true—these protesters were very connected, in groups and
networks. Not every Tunisian and Egyptian had access to a computer. But mobile
phones were the key mediating instrument bridging the communication gaps:
they could be easily carried and concealed, could often be used to shoot and
upload photos and videos, and could be recharged in the street. Given the high
rates of mobile phone use, especially in the dense urban centers, it is safe to say
that each person at the protests either had a mobile phone, or was part of a
group in which there were several mobile civic journalists and bloggers.
Before the Arab Spring, most social movement theorists had landed on a
straightforward way of describing the importance of digital media. Digital media
affected the costs and benefits of action, the opportunities and constraints on
actor commitment, and was one of many resources available to activist leaders
(Earl and Kimport 2011). In Bimber’s account “socio-technological devices do
not determine political outcomes, but simply alter the matrix of opportunities
and costs associated with intermediation, mobilization and the organization of
politics” (Bimber 2003:231). But the Arab Spring has demonstrated that digital
media are tools with which activist leaders evaluate costs and benefits, but also a
fundament infrastructure that varied political actors make use of in intended
and democratically consequential ways.
Conclusion
What might have made regimes more susceptible than others to popular upris-
ings, and what might explain the relative successes of some movements more
than others? What role does information technology have in the modern recipe
for democratization?
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Long-term democratic entrenchment might come from truth-based online
advocacy, constituent mobilization, and crowd-sourced social monitoring (Fung,
Gilman, and Shkabatur 2013). Until the Arab Spring, much of the scholarly
research on the political impact of digital media over the last decade supported
this perspective (Howard 2010). But this comparative analysis demonstrates that
digital media may also have a role in rapid political transformations. Weighing
multiple political, economic, and cultural conditions, we find that information
infrastructure—especially mobile phone use—consistently appears as one of the
key ingredients in parsimonious models for the conjoined combinations of
causes behind regime fragility and social movement success. Internet use is rele-
vant in some solution sets, but by causal logic it is actually the absence of Inter-
net use that explains low levels of success by Arab Spring movements.
In every single case, the inciting incidents of the Arab Spring were digitally
mediated in some way. Information infrastructure, in the form of mobile
phones, personal computers, and social media, were part of the causal story we
must tell about the Arab Spring. People were inspired to protest for many differ-
ent and always personal reasons. Information technologies mediated that inspira-
tion, such that the revolutions followed each other by a few weeks and had
notably similar patterns. Certainly there were different political outcomes, but
that does not diminish the important role of digital media in the Arab Spring. It
is precisely a reason why we must understand which configurations of informa-
tion infrastructure can best serve the needs of democratic activists. It is also why
authoritarian states have learned important lessons in how best to reconfigure
their management of their telecommunications industries and censorship proto-
cols. But even more importantly, this investigation has illustrated that countries
that do not have a civil society equipped with digital scaffolding are much less
likely to experience popular movements for democracy—an observation we are
able to make only by accounting for the constellation of causal variables that
existed before the street protests began, not simply the short-term uses of digital
technologies during the short period of political upheaval.
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